

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

THE UNIVERSITY  
OF MICHIGAN

APR 2 1963

DOCUMENT  
COLLECTION

PRIVATE

ENDC/PV.80

5 September 1962

ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE EIGHTIETH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Wednesday, 5 September 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman

Mr. M. MALITZA

(Romania)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J.A. de ARAUJO CASTRO  
Mr. RODRIGUES RIBAS  
Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE  
Mr. J. LENGYEL

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV  
Mr. G. GUELEV  
Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS  
Mr. S.F. RAE  
Mr. J.E.G. HARDY  
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. ZEMLA  
Mr. V. TYLNER  
Mr. J. RIHA

Ethiopia:

ATO HADDIS ALAMAYEHU  
ATO M. HAMID  
ATO GETACHEW KEBRETH

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL  
Mr. A.S. MEHTA  
Mr. P.M. GEORGE  
Mr. G.D. COMMAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
Mr. A. CAGIATI  
Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI  
Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO  
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG  
Miss E. AGUIRRE  
Mr. D. GONZALES GOMEZ

Nigeria:

Mr. M.T. LABU  
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI  
Mr. M. LOBODYCZ  
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI  
Mr. W. WIECZOREK

Romania:

Mr. M. MALITZA  
Mr. H. FLORESCU  
Mr. E. GLASER  
Mr. N. ECOBESCU

Sweden:

Mr. R. EDBERG  
Mr. P. KELLIN  
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.V. KUZNETSOV  
Mr. A.A. ROSCHIN  
Mr. A.N. SHEVCHENKO  
Mr. B.I. POKLAD

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN  
Mr. M.H. El-ZAYYAT  
Mr. A.E. ABDEN MAGUID  
Mr. S. AHMED

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER  
Sir Michael WRIGHT  
Mr. D.N. BRINSON  
Mr. J.M. EDES

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN  
Mr. C.C. STELLE  
Mr. D.E. MARK  
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Deputy to the Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Romania): I declare open the eightieth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I am grateful for this opportunity of addressing the Committee this morning, but I should like to start with an apology because I have to leave for London soon after I have concluded my speech. I do apologize for having to do it in this way, but I can assure representatives that I shall study their latest speeches in the verbatim record with much interest, and I can only regret that I shall not be here to have the pleasure of listening to them in person.

Before I leave I wish to say a few words first on the general question of general and complete disarmament, and then to turn for a short time to the problem of nuclear tests. I shall begin with a summary of the progress of our discussions of the last seven weeks on general and complete disarmament.

I suppose that we shall all leave Geneva this time regretting that we have not made as much progress as we might have hoped when we reconvened in July. I share that disappointment which some representatives have already expressed. However, lack of progress can be explained, I think, to some extent by the fact that the Committee --- and I make no complaint about this --- very properly has occupied a good deal of its time with the problem of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. Moreover, our discussions on general and complete disarmament have undoubtedly made some progress, even if only limited. The representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union have both put forward important modifications on certain issues in their draft plans, and indeed some measure of agreement in principle has been reached in the field of conventional armaments in relation to stage I. Thus, although we have many difficulties to resolve, such progress, in my view, is very definitely on the credit side.

I am sure that representatives will agree that the discussions during our second session have proceeded in somewhat greater depth and detail than was the case in our first session when we were having a preliminary look at the whole field. But that deeper consideration has, in my opinion, proved of very real value because it has pointed up the nature and the complexity of the problems involved in any treaty on general and complete disarmament. Above all, it has helped to define and to

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clarify those problems in such a way that further progress will, I earnestly hope, be possible when, after the recess, we proceed with the further discussion of the items on our agreed agenda (ENDC/52).

As I have said the progress we have made is not very great, but nevertheless there has been progress and when we return I hope we can all agree that we must continue and intensify our efforts. But there is one thing on which I would make a special appeal to our Soviet colleagues. I would ask them to reconsider during the recess their attitude in particular to expert working groups. So far, as my colleagues round the table will recall, they have always resisted the setting up of these and, as I understand it, they have resisted it on the ground that we must first reach political decisions. That argument seems to me, quite frankly, to be mistaken. Of course, no one wants to put the political decisions on to the shoulders of groups of experts. That would be wrong, and we all recognize it. But, if experts can define some of the problems, define them more clearly, for those of us sitting round this table to take the decisions on them, then I honestly believe that it would simplify and not complicate our task. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the field of nuclear delivery vehicles and conventional weapons. If experts could define the scope of that problem I honestly believe that it could facilitate agreement in that field. I instance this as a case in point because we have so recently been discussing it. And so I do ask our Soviet colleagues quite frankly to look at it again and to see whether they cannot help us in this sphere.

I would ask our Soviet colleagues also to look again during the recess at the two rocks that stand in the path of agreement on stage I, and I would say that those two rocks are the Soviet demand for full 100 per cent elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles and the Soviet demand for the dismantling of all foreign bases. I look on those demands as being rocks which could obstruct us in our task of seeking to achieve a treaty. Both have been shown repeatedly and clearly to be points which, in my view, breach seriously the agreed principles (ENDC/5). Both of them have been shown to be wholly unnecessary to any well ordered plan. Why do I say that? I say it because both problems will solve themselves in stages II and III if we can proceed either on the lines proposed in the Western plan or on some similar lines. Those are not insuperable problems in the whole field. They are only problems in degree, and in such sense I do ask our Soviet colleagues to look at them again.

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All nuclear vehicles will disappear and all foreign bases will go under both treaties; it is just a question of at what stage that should be. And so I do ask for their co-operation there.

In addition, I ask our Soviet colleague to give further and urgent thought to the question of verification. He and his colleagues before him have really brought forward no solution whatever to the problem which the attitude of his own Government alone creates. It is his Government which has created this problem for us -- that is, the provision of adequate verification procedures which do not justify Soviet fears about espionage. No one else, as I say, has created that problem, and only the Soviet Union, in fact, has turned down the one new approach that has been put forward in an endeavour to solve it. I do say, and I say it very seriously, that for the Soviet Union to create the problem in the first place and then to reject the attempts of others to solve it, while putting forward no suggestions of its own for solving it, is really not helping our work forward. And so I say: please do give some further thought to this, and we will look very seriously at any proposal that the Soviet Union may choose to make designed to overcome that very real and particular difficulty.

I put forward those thoughts not in any sense provocatively but out of the genuine desire of my Government to make progress in this immense task which we have all set ourselves. It is a daunting enough task in itself without any added problems which, by our attitudes, any of us may create. I would not say, of course, that the Western approach is entirely without blemish. It would be strange indeed if it were. We are ready to listen to cogent arguments about our proposals and to consider such arguments on their merits. I only ask that others should do the same in regard to the proposals which we have put forward.

Now I should like to turn to the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. Our colleague from Nigeria said at our seventy-sixth meeting on 29 August:

"... very little if any progress can in fact be achieved on the general issue of disarmament if we do not first of all secure a treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests." (ENDC/PV.76, p. 39)

I am sure that that statement sums up the general feeling of the whole Committee. I would not of course wish to suggest that our efforts towards general and complete disarmament are conditional on conclusion of a nuclear test ban treaty, but if we

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cannot find the will to come together on a treaty banning nuclear weapon tests then the prospects of progress on general and complete disarmament certainly do seem depressing.

Now I should like to say here with how much interest the United Kingdom delegation listened to the various speeches of the representative of the non-aligned countries recently, and notably on Monday (ENDC/PV.73), when almost the whole morning was occupied by their speeches. Without implying any criticism of others who spoke then, I would say that I thought that that succession of interesting, thoughtful and objective speeches taken together made a real impact. I am not saying I agreed with everything that was then said, but in the general tone that they set they gave the rest of us a very good example; and in commending it in that way I hope that any of our uncommitted colleagues who did not happen to speak on Monday morning will not think that I am making comments against them. I am merely saying that the impact of those speeches together was most refreshing, and I thought there were in some of those speeches some very interesting thoughts.

Our colleague from Burma, who has now had to leave, put forward one or two very interesting suggestions which deserve very careful thought -- and certainly during the weeks ahead we shall want to give thought to them -- and so did others of our colleagues who spoke then. Our colleague from India, of course, at that time was speaking mostly on general and complete disarmament but he put forward some very pertinent questions too. As I am dealing now with nuclear tests, I do not propose to follow those at the present time. But I was, as I say, very struck by the whole impact of that meeting of our Conference.

Now I want to consider the whole question of nuclear tests and to try to put it in the context which seems to me to be right. President Kennedy has reminded us that the United States wants to work for a treaty to come into force by 1 January and, if possible, to be signed by 1 November. The United Kingdom supports that view. Such a timetable would mean that the present series of tests being conducted by the Soviet Union would, in fact, be the last major series by either side. I would say that that proposal is a generous one, and the United Kingdom fully supports and endorses it. But if that aim is going to be realized we must work hard and fast. We cannot afford to exchange generalities. We have to get down to immediate practical negotiations, and it is with that in mind that the United States and the United Kingdom have placed on the conference table two draft treaties, one



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covering all four environments (ENDC/58) and one covering all except underground tests (ENDC/59). That second draft treaty -- the partial one -- we conceive of as a step towards a treaty in all four environments, and we have said that both treaties are negotiable.

The United States and the United Kingdom have invited the Soviet Union to continue negotiations in the Sub-Committee during the recess so that the present opportunity -- which is a very real opportunity, I think -- may not be lost. And here I must be quite plain; if the offer to make the present massive series of Soviet tests the last of its kind fails, then it is obvious that the whole dreadful and deadly game of leapfrog could begin again. This is a real opportunity and we should grasp it. That I believe is the manner in which we should view the present situation. With that in mind I want deliberately to avoid saying anything today which might imperil the chances of an agreement. My main purpose is to pledge my country to do all that we can to turn this chance of early agreement into reality.

But I cannot, if I am to be honest, fail to say that my Government could not help being deeply depressed by the response of the Soviet Union so far to the new United Kingdom-United States draft treaties. Those treaties were put forward in good faith. They deserve a response in good faith. They were put forward on the express basis of a willingness to negotiate upon them; in return they deserve an equal willingness from the other side to negotiate. Mr. Kuznetsov has given me the impression of being without new instructions so far. I have not lost hope that that is the case and that, in fact, a more favourable response from Moscow may be forthcoming.

But meanwhile Mr. Kuznetsov has used two main arguments in rejecting negotiations upon the Western draft comprehensive treaty, a rejection of negotiation which I most sincerely hope is only temporary. He has argued that there were many similarities between the new Western draft comprehensive treaty of 27 August (ENDC/58) and the Western draft treaty of 18 April 1961 (ENDC/9). He suggested that that was in some way reprehensible and he has indicated that our proposal of 27 August, in fact, included nothing new. That Mr. Kuznetsov should feel obliged to base himself on such an argument indicates with perfect clarity just how weak, as it seems to me, his own present case is. Of course there are similarities between our two draft treaties. Of course, as Mr. Kuznetsov showed, there are even articles, or paragraphs, drafted in precisely the same terms. But I must say that Mr. Kuznetsov

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appears to forget that we spent a very long time in the nuclear test Conference hammering out the texts of some of those paragraphs and articles with the Soviet Union, and we reached agreement on them. We thought that they were sensible texts and in many cases they were of a general nature indispensable to any treaty really set forth for governing properly the banning of nuclear tests, no matter how much some of the fundamental provisions of that treaty might be changed. In fact, if I may put it this way, they are really part of the nuts and bolts of a treaty.

Mr. Kuznetsov, as a former engineer, will I am sure appreciate that point; and to suggest that it is reprehensible on our part to retain some of the nuts and bolts previously created with the help of Soviet representatives seems to me to be both illogical and, if I may say so, really unworthy as an argument.

I do not want to dwell on that aspect of Mr. Kuznetsov's argument any further, but there is another aspect of it to which I do want to draw particular attention because it does seem to me to be significant as showing an indication of Soviet intentions. I must say quite frankly to the Committee that that particular point I found to be most deeply disturbing. My colleagues will note that Mr. Kuznetsov drew attention at our afternoon meeting on 3 September (ENDC/PV.79, p. 32) to paragraph 11 of article VIII of our new draft comprehensive treaty whereby each of the parties would undertake to give inspection teams, dispatched pursuant to the article, access to the area in which on-site inspection would be conducted, to refrain from interference with the operation of teams and to give them assistance. Our Soviet colleague argued that that reproduced very closely a similar provision in our 1961 draft. So far, so good. But, if I understood him correctly, he went further than that; he implied that that provision was not necessary. He even seemed to imply that it was undesirable.

That is what I find extremely worrying and almost sinister, because what, in fact, did that article say, as quoted by Mr. Kuznetsov himself? It said:

"Each of the Parties undertakes to give inspection teams, despatched pursuant to this Article, immediate and undisputed access to the area in which an on-site inspection is to be conducted, to refrain from interference with any operation of an inspection team and to give such teams the assistance they may require in the performance of their mission." (ENDC/58, p.9)

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That was what it said. I have already made the point, I think, that many of those articles were agreed with our Soviet colleagues earlier, and that was one of them. That was so agreed. But the point is that, in fact, that is not part of an article; it is not a paragraph which is stating that inspection teams shall visit the territory. It is a paragraph laying down what shall happen when an inspection team in fact does visit that territory. It is merely saying that an inspection team shall have the right of free access when it goes to carry out its job. If Mr. Kuznetsov has singled that out and criticized it in the way he has done, is he not in fact saying that the attitude of the Soviet Union to the matter at the present time is not only, to say the least, equivocal over whether it will invite inspection, but also that if and when it has invited inspection it is not necessarily going to give complete freedom to an inspection team? If that is what he is saying, then it is indeed very serious. If that is not what he is saying, then why did he raise the point at all?

I think the Conference is entitled to a clear indication of what his real views on this are. I hope very much they are not what I feared them to be on listening to him making that particular point. If they are not that, then there was no real justification for making the point at all, because, as I have said, once it is decided to have the inspection, then obviously whatever party, whether by invitation or by obligation, has the inspection surely must give full facilities to the inspection team. Therefore, I thought it right to draw the attention of my colleagues to that particular point. I do want it to be quite clear where we stand in relation to this, and I hope very much that our Soviet colleague also will show us exactly where he stands in regard to it. After all, I thought we had already got this position clear earlier on: that where there was inspection it should be free inspection. Mr. Tsarapkin used to say in the old test ban conference: "You inspect us and we inspect you;" and Mr. Gromyko at an earlier meeting of the disarmament Committee expressed a similar thought. Therefore, I hope we are going to get this cleared up.

I want to take up one further point from what Mr. Kuznetsov said the other day. He asked the following question:

"Is it not clear that the United States and United Kingdom proposals offer considerable possibilities for arbitrary actions by the staff of the international control organization which might endanger the security of States?" (ENDC/PV.79, p.34)

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I do not want to labour the point because, regrettably, it is not a new one, but I draw attention to the fact that this seems to indicate once again that the Soviet Union is not prepared to accept the concept of an impartial international civil service. Indeed, it seems to assume that the international staff proposed under our draft treaty would automatically work against Soviet interests. Quite apart from the fact that that seems to indicate an astonishing lack of confidence in the minds of the Soviet representatives it is something which we have firmly repudiated in the past and which we must continue firmly to repudiate. We do believe that international civil servants can be and are as a whole loyal and impartial.

Those then are some of the points in regard to Mr. Kuznetsov's arguments about the similarity between our new draft treaty and the treaty of April 1961. There are many more points one could make, but I do not want to labour the matter too much. I was really rather sorry that he based so much of his argument upon that point. I would only say that it is quite clear that on the essential points we have moved. We have accepted the international scientific commission; we have accepted national detection posts; and we have shown quite clearly that we are thinking of far fewer detection posts, just as we are thinking of fewer on-site inspections. Those are very real moves forward and I do not think they should be turned aside in that way.

Let me now turn to Mr. Kuznetsov's second main argument. He suggested that our draft treaty was unacceptable because it was not based on the eight Power memorandum (ENDC/28). In support of his case in this instance he adduced some isolated remarks of the representatives of the sponsors of the eight-Power memorandum, but he continues to show what I can only describe as an almost pathological reluctance to consider the remarks made by the sponsors in this Committee in the context of their speeches as a whole. He continues to interpret isolated passages in the eight-Power memorandum instead of looking at it as a whole. And he ignores the authoritative statement by the spokesman for the eight Powers at that time, the representative of Ethiopia, who told us that we were not to take the memorandum as a blueprint for a treaty (ENDC/PV.24, p.5). Indeed, he ignores the fact that it would be quite impossible to take the memorandum as a blueprint. The memorandum is not in treaty form. It was never intended, as I understand it, to be in such form. What we have tried to do, to the best of our ability, is to take fully into account the ideas behind the memorandum in bringing forward our own new comprehensive treaty.

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Mr. Kuznetsov may say that in trying to do that we have failed. He may say that the ideas contained in our draft treaty do not correspond precisely with the ideas in the memorandum. But if we are to negotiate a treaty we have to have a draft text. This we have provided, and we claim that it embodies the main ideas in the eight Power memorandum. I do not honestly see how we can make progress if we do not work somewhere on those lines. I would remind our Soviet colleague that so many times I have urged him and his predecessors here at this Conference to get down to serious negotiation with us on the basis of that text; many times we have tried to draw them into negotiation. If they declined then it really is not for them to criticize us when we do produce a draft treaty.

I would point out that in submitting our draft we have made our position absolutely clear. That at least, I would have thought, is an advantage, and I am afraid it is more than can be claimed so far for the Soviet position. Moreover, we are prepared to negotiate -- really to negotiate. The representative of Romania at our last meeting suggested (ENDC/PV.79, p.43) that our draft could not be called negotiable because it included provision for a quota of compulsory on-site inspection; just as he argued that our partial treaty could not be called negotiable because it did not make provision for an uncontrolled moratorium on underground tests. Those were the points which you yourself, Mr. Chairman, made on that occasion. I shall deal with the question of the extent to which our draft is negotiable in commenting now on the extent to which we conceive the draft to embody the principal ideas in the eight-Power memorandum.

Mr. Kuznetsov was at pains on Monday to suggest that on each of those three ideas -- which are well known to all of us, namely, the international commission, the detection system, and inspection -- we were out of step with the eight-Power memorandum. He claims that we are adhering to old positions.

May I take first the question of the international commission? Mr. Kuznetsov argues that our intention is to set up a control organization similar to that provided for in our treaty of April 1961. Well, we have really tried to do nothing whatever of the sort, apart from incorporating certain ideas relating to the functioning of any international commission which is going to have responsibilities of the type envisaged for it in the eight-Power memorandum. We have in fact incorporated in our provisions for setting up the commission a number of the ideas

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previously accepted by the Soviet Union as essential to the smooth working of such a body. What we have done in particular is to examine the proposed functions of the commission, to think those functions through in detail, to suggest what they would inspire and then to suggest the machinery which would be necessary to enable the commission to carry them out.

What are those functions? First, the memorandum suggests that the commission should be entrusted with the tasks of processing all data received from the agreed system of observation posts and of reporting on any nuclear explosion or suspicious event on the basis of a thorough and objective examination of all the available data. That is what the memorandum proposed. Secondly, the commission would have to organize visits to the territories of parties to the treaty and would have to conduct on-site inspection. Thirdly, the commission would need to carry out consultation with parties. Fourthly, it must surely be the commission which must consider the establishment of new posts and reach agreement with parties to the treaty about the location of such posts and the use of the existing national networks.

I should have thought that all of this adds up to a very sizeable task, with many responsibilities. We think that in order to carry out such responsibilities the commission would have to be organized in the manner we have proposed. We have thought through our proposals in detail and we have put them into treaty language. But we recognize that all the details of the proposals may not be acceptable; they may need discussion; they may need further consideration. That is why we have presented our text. We are ready to negotiate; we only hope that others will join us. It would seem to me that, if we are ready to negotiate on that particular aspect of our proposals, we can hardly be called inflexible, because they form a very important part of the whole.

So much for the international commission. I have dealt mainly with the problem of providing for its establishment and operation, in treaty language, with particular reference to the functions envisaged for it in the eight-Power memorandum. But anyone taking the trouble to compare the text of our draft of 27 August with that of our draft of April 1961 on the subject would see that not only the size but the whole character of the commission proposed is drastically altered.

Now I should like to turn to the second of the principles covered by the eight-Power memorandum: that of a network of observation posts and institutions. Mr. Kuznetsov argues that the proposals in our new draft treaty are the same as

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before. He seems to argue this on the grounds that they involve the possibility of a measure of international supervision over the control posts integrated into the system, from which the international scientific commission would derive its information. All I can say here is that if Mr. Kuznetsov or any other Soviet representative can describe to us how existing national detection posts -- for instance, posts run, as many of them are, by universities and such, all of which have their own specific methods and objectives at the moment -- could operate as the basis of, to quote the memorandum, "a system for continuous observation and effective control" (ENDC/28), then I should be glad if he would explain that to us. I should be glad if he would tell us how such a system could be -- and again I quote the memorandum -- "established by agreement", unless some form of international supervision were envisaged. I should be glad if he would tell us how new posts could be established by agreement unless they were new posts established according to international criteria of some kind. In that connexion, the suggestion put forward by our Swedish colleague, Mrs. Myrdal, when she was here, about drawing up a list of the present capabilities would have been very valuable to us at the present time. However, as that suggestion was not acted upon, in spite of the fact that some of us endorsed it, we have to take the position as it is.

All we have done in drafting article VII of our draft comprehensive treaty is to take the ideas contained in the eight-Power memorandum, to think them through and then to put our conclusions on paper in treaty language. If any member of this Committee has objections to the proposals contained in this or related articles, we are perfectly prepared once more to discuss those objections. As I have said so many times, we want to negotiate. So this is a second major area of the treaty where we are only too ready in fact to negotiate.

There is another point about the detection system we are proposing in our new draft treaty which apparently Mr. Kuznetsov wants to brush aside but which is surely of the first importance when we come to consider -- or, as I hope, when he comes to consider with us -- whether there could really be any danger of espionage under our proposals. Under our 1961 proposals (ENDC/9) two out of three persons operating detection posts in the Soviet Union would have been foreigners. Under our new proposals, to meet Soviet wishes, we are not proposing, unless the Soviet Government agrees, the presence of one single foreign national on Soviet territory as an operating member of a detection station. That indeed is very different from our proposals of April 1961.

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Finally, let me look now at the question of inspection, which our Soviet colleague described as the kernel of the proposals of the United States and the United Kingdom concerning the cessation of tests of all nuclear weapons.

Mr. Kuznetsov referred to obligatory on-site inspection. I acknowledge, and I have always acknowledged, that that is the most difficult of the problems confronting us. I have said so many times. But it is only difficult -- and I must say this -- because the Soviet Union continues to make it the most difficult.

I would ask the Committee to assess the validity of the approach taken towards the problem by the West and that taken by the Soviet Union. We for our part say that we do not think that it is possible that existing techniques, even if they should be combined into an efficient international organization, could identify all suspicious and significant events which may be detected. Really it is as simple as that. We would add, however, that, if and when it should prove to be possible, then we should be prepared to rely on a system based on national detection systems. But, so long as it is not, we say that a certain proportion of those unidentified events should be liable to inspection. We are asking for a smaller number of inspections in the Soviet Union than we were asking for in 1961. We think that some are necessary as a deterrent, but here again we are ready to negotiate. The number is negotiable. Further, we are prepared to be convinced that we are wrong. We ask that anyone who has the scientific evidence proving to us that we are wrong should tell us. If that evidence is good, we will accept it, and we would forget about on-site inspection straight away.

That is our position, and I submit soberly and confidently that it is an honest, sound and reasonable position. That position, too, seems to us to be well in accord with the spirit of the eight-Power memorandum. The memorandum does not assume that all events can be identified by existing detection systems; it says that there may be "suspicious and significant" events. After referring to the possibility of a party's voluntarily offering to invite inspections, it suggests that in order to identify such events the commission may wish to request on-site inspection. It goes on to propose that the commission could consult about on-site inspection if that would facilitate its assessment of an unidentified event, and it states firmly:

"The party concerned would ... give speedy and full co-operation to facilitate the assessment." (ENDC/28, p.2)

If the memorandum is read as a whole, and if our new proposals are read as a whole, I do not see that they can possibly be described as incompatible.



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That, then, is the position of the United Kingdom and the United States in relation to the eight-Power memorandum. We think our proposals are in accordance with the spirit of the memorandum. We do not think that the sponsors of the memorandum asked anything more of us than to put forward proposals in such a sense. They told us that their memorandum was not a blueprint for a treaty. We have offered a blueprint for a treaty, but we are ready to discuss it.

Now, what has the Soviet Union done in this regard? So far as the international commission is concerned it has told us that it accepts the eight-Power memorandum as it stands and that the commission must consist of a limited number of highly qualified scientists, and no more. Soviet representatives have made no attempt to explain to us how the commission would work; they have completely ignored the tasks envisaged for the commission in the memorandum; they have just repeated that we must accept a commission of a limited number of highly qualified scientists. So far as the detection system is concerned, Soviet representatives have told us that national detection posts are sufficient to monitor a test ban treaty. They ignore all the rest of the language in paragraph 3 of the joint memorandum. They refuse to consider the problems involved in coordinating national stations. In other words, there too they have failed to think out their position. As for inspection, as I see it Soviet representatives continue to argue two things. First, they say that no inspection is necessary because existing detection systems are adequate both to detect and to identify. As I have said already, we are prepared to accept that assertion when we are provided with the evidence for it. We do not think it unreasonable to ask for the evidence before we accept the assertion. Until we have the evidence we cannot accept either it or the assertion based on it. Secondly, Soviet representatives argue that on-site inspection would be unacceptable because it would involve espionage. Here I would revert to the question of control posts in the Soviet Union inasmuch as the same argument is used so far as they are concerned. At our last meeting Mr. Kuznetsov said that:

"the United States-United Kingdom proposals of 18 April 1961 were aimed at establishing, under the pretext of carrying out international control over the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, a widespread network of espionage in the interests of the circles which are preparing for a nuclear war."

(ENDC/PV.79, p. 28)

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

Those were his words to us on Monday -- "a widespread network". At that time, that is in 1961, the Western Proposals involved the presence of or visits by a maximum --- not of each but of the two together --- of 500 foreign nationals in the Soviet Union during any one year. We were asking, in fact, for 19 international control posts and 20 on-site inspections. That constituted what Mr. Kuznetsov described as a widespread spy network. But to be fair about this I must point out that at that same time the Soviet Union was prepared to accept 15 control posts and 3 on-site inspections a year on Soviet territory, which on the basis we were then discussing would have involved about 310 foreign nationals being on Soviet territory. The difference between the 310 that the Soviet Union was willing to contemplate with equanimity at that time and the 500 proposed by the West at that time really does not seem to me to be very sensational. So if Mr. Kuznetsov described the Western proposals of that time as a widespread spy network he would, I presume, describe the Soviet proposals of that time as giving the West a moderate spy network in the Soviet Union. I do not know why the Soviet Union was happy with that then, but that is the inexorable result if his argument is taken to its logical conclusion.

What are we now proposing? We are proposing visits by 'certainly less than 100 foreign nationals to Soviet territory in any one year -- that is to say, we are proposing less than one-fifth of what we were proposing in 1961, and less than one-third of what the Soviet Union itself claimed it was ready to accept. I just do not understand how Mr. Kuznetsov can say that it is not a major move by the West. Nor do I understand how he can say that any real risk of espionage is involved at the present time when his Government put forward with apparent sincerity proposals accepting three times as many foreign nationals on its territory only a little over a year ago, and I think we are entitled to further thought by our Soviet colleague in that connexion.

In any case, the whole Soviet argument does not seem to be justified, because those visiting international neutral technicians whom we are now proposing as members of inspection teams would travel about the Soviet Union in Soviet transport under the closest observation by Soviet technicians. And meanwhile from my own country alone some thousands of tourists now visit the Soviet Union every year. I am very glad they are allowed to do so, but that being the case how can it be

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

said that the small, minimal number of people now proposed would in fact constitute a serious risk of espionage by the West? So I say to our Soviet colleague that I hope he will not continue to press that argument, because it seems to me to have no reality.

I am sorry if I have had to show here that, as I see it, the position of the Soviet Union remains completely inflexible. In fact, there has not been any move by the Soviet Union, as I understand it, since November 1961, and of course that was a backward move. On all the three principles of the eight Power memorandum the Soviet Union appears to me to stand fast on positions which, basically, it adopted in November 1961. As I understand it, in the Soviet view the international commission is apparently to have no powers, control posts are not to be co-ordinated and inspection is to be by invitation, and in the light of Soviet statements to this Conference what that means is very difficult indeed to define. I appeal once more to Mr. Kuznetsov, and through him to his Government, to show some willingness to negotiate on our comprehensive draft.

I have dealt with this at some length because I thought it was important in the light of what Mr. Kuznetsov said to us on Monday, but I should like to refer very briefly to our other proposals, because in our endeavour to get agreement we have not only put in our comprehensive text but have also produced our text of a partial treaty as well -- a partial treaty banning tests in all environments except underground. We look on this as a temporary measure until we can get agreement on underground tests too, and I do emphasize that -- it is not looked upon as a permanent measure, but as a temporary one helping us forward. If the Soviet Union will accept this offer, which after all does go a very long way to meet its own proposals of last November, then we shall be able to see an early and lasting cessation of those tests in the atmosphere which are the main cause of concern to people throughout the world. All we say we are not prepared to do in this context is accept an uncontrolled and unpoliced moratorium. At our meeting on 31 August (ENDC/PV.77) I spelled out clearly the reasons for that and I have nothing to add to what I said on that score. I think our position is quite clear. But the text for a partial ban is also a very real step forward in the Western position from our previous position, and it is one that deserves a

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

much more forthcoming reply from our Soviet colleague than anything we have yet heard from him. I do say that to him in all seriousness. I reject, and I must reject, out of hand the really pathetic argument -- and I think it is a pathetic argument -- that a partial ban would legalize tests in the remaining environment. The truth of course is that underground tests would not be one whit more legal under such an arrangement than they are now, while the cessation of tests in other environments would not only be an immense gain in itself but would also concentrate pressure on the final and important remaining environment and so should help to speed up agreement on a fully comprehensive treaty. In other words, what I am saying is that our partial treaty is not something that should be looked at apart; it would be looked at as a genuine step towards the final conclusion, and a step that will, I believe, help towards the final conclusion, of a comprehensive treaty. I say that this does deserve a much more forthcoming response from our Soviet colleague than it has had so far.

Mr. Kuznetsov has of course devoted a good deal of time to the thesis that the Western proposals are not new, either of them; but in regard to a partial ban I must remind him that we have done away with the provision for aircraft sampling flights -- that is to say for inspection for atmospheric tests; we have dropped the complicated arrangements previously agreed with the Soviet Union for the international monitoring system for events in outer space; and we have abandoned the provisions for international control vessels to monitor under water tests. In all these three environments, therefore, our proposals are totally new and go the whole way to meet the Soviet desire to avoid on-site inspection. That is one more reason why I ask him to look at that again.

The position as I see it at the moment is this: if the Soviet Union wishes it can have a treaty banning tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under-water at once. If it feels it is essential to include underground tests also, it can have an all-embracing comprehensive treaty at once if it will only agree to a very small quota of obligatory on-site inspections. And if it does not think on-site inspection is necessary all we ask is that it should show us the basis of its scientific knowledge and help to lead us forward to the same

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

conclusion that it has apparently reached; all we say is we want evidence on which to base such a claim.

That, therefore, is the position. But I should like to conclude with an appeal to our Soviet colleagues. I have tried to spell out the position as I genuinely see it. The West wants to negotiate; we want to get a treaty. We have made those offers. There is also the offer clearly made by President Kennedy to make 1 January a firm date if agreement can be reached before then. Those are real and very substantial moves forward. We have proposed also that our Sub-Committee should continue to meet during the recess; we are still awaiting anxiously the response of the Soviet Government to that request. All those moves are genuine attempts to get agreement. We desperately want agreement and we want to do all we possibly can to get it. I do beg our Soviet colleagues to consider just how far the West has come forward to meet them in both the draft treaties we have put forward. I do beg him not to spend all his time in looking for points of disagreement. I ask him genuinely and sincerely to look for points of agreement rather than disagreement. If he will only do that he will find the West very responsive indeed. And really our record here is clear. We have made every step we possibly can to come forward to meet the Soviet Union. All I am asking for is a response which will enable us to conclude an agreement. That is what I want and want most desperately, and I ask our Soviet colleague in all genuine sincerity to approach it in the same way and make it possible for us to conclude an agreement on the basis of either of the treaties we have put forward, or to negotiate with us in such a way as to get agreement. That is all I ask.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): Since the discussion in which we are at present engaged is coming to an end, it tends, in one way or another, to range over the different topics which have been raised here.

I should now like to speak on the question of nuclear tests which has been the subject of a broad discussion in the last few days.

Early last week the United States and the United Kingdom delegations submitted, as we know, two draft treaties, one banning nuclear weapon tests in all environments (ENDC/PV.58) and the other banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater (ENDC/PV.59). The Soviet delegation again defined its position on this question and made detailed comments on both drafts. We are thus confronted, at the moment, with two positions - that of the Western nuclear Powers and that of the Soviet Union - with regard to nuclear tests.

What are the positions of the two sides in question on the ending of nuclear tests?

We wish to make a few remarks on some aspects of those positions - and particularly on the draft treaties submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom - with the object of throwing light on the above-mentioned positions.

The first draft treaty submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom on the banning of all nuclear tests is, in reality, but a new edition of their earlier proposals on the same subject. That is the fact of the matter, despite our United Kingdom colleague's efforts today to cite all manner of arguments, or rather fragments of arguments. The draft provides, as Mr. Dean said in his speech of 27 August, the day on which the said draft was submitted, for the acceptance of the obligatory character of on-site inspection and for the establishment of a network of new detection stations equipped with instruments of various types, stations which would be internationally supervised and monitored. (ENDC/PV.75, pages 5 and 6).

In our statement of 17 August (ENDC/PV.71, pp. 5 - 13) we commented on the allegedly new Anglo-American proposals put forward by the United States representative on 14 August (ENDC/PV.69). We said at the time that those proposals had been inspired by certain influential United States circles in the firm belief that they would be rejected by the Soviet Union. It was possible to make them because members of different committees and, in particular the Joint Congressional

Atomic Energy Committee, had formed the conviction that they were unacceptable to the Soviet Union under present conditions, as indeed they were throughout our previous discussions, in view of scientific developments in the technique of detecting and identifying seismic events.

In his speeches of 27 and 31 August (ENDC/PV.75 and 77) the United States representative tried to present the first draft treaty on the banning of all nuclear tests (ENDC/58) as taking account of the constructive proposals of the memorandum of the eight non-aligned Powers dated 16 April 1962 (ENDC/28).

It would be a waste of time to expatiate on the inaccuracy of the arguments of the United States delegation.

I cannot refrain, however, from pointing out once again that the United States and the United Kingdom proposals contained in the draft treaty on the banning of nuclear weapon tests in all environments (ENDC/58) provide, according to the statements of the United States delegation itself, for the acceptance of the principle of obligatory on-site inspection, whereas in the eight-Power memorandum it is explicitly emphasized that "the parties to the treaty could invite the (international) Commission to visit their territories and/or the site of the event the nature of which was in doubt." (ENDC/28, paragraph 4).

In his statement of 31 August 1962 the United States representative categorically opposed the principle of invitation which is one of the fundamental principles of the eight-Power memorandum (ENDC/PV.77, p. 40 ). Therefore on that important point, not only do the new Western proposals not take account of the eight-Power memorandum, but are diametrically opposed to it.

In the second place the international commission provided for in the United States draft - which, according to this draft would be composed of representatives of nuclear Powers and their allies as well as of representatives of non-aligned Powers - is in practice and in essence nothing more than the old proposal which was canvassed at the 1961 talks.

In addition, we should point out that the commission suggested in the eight-Power memorandum is an international commission composed of a small number of eminent scientists from the non-aligned countries. Here again the proposals contained in the draft treaty submitted by the United States and United Kingdom are at variance with those of the memorandum of the eight non-aligned Powers.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

A few minutes ago, the United Kingdom representative tried to convince us that it was absolutely necessary that the commission should be composed as he suggested and that this was, apparently, in conformity with the spirit of the memorandum. We venture not only to question that statement but even to express our utter disagreement with it. All the more, since in the eight-Power memorandum it is made perfectly clear that the international commission should be composed only of scientists and of representatives of the non-aligned countries.

We do not wish to speak at length now on the question of the functions and powers of the executive officer, an institution borrowed from the earlier United States and United Kingdom proposals. The fact is that that officer is invested with all the functions - and more - which under the eight-Power memorandum are vested in the international commission. The international commission composed as the non-aligned Powers proposed would be left with nothing to do.

This comparison of the main provisions of the Western draft treaty and those of the eight-Power memorandum shows that the United States and the United Kingdom draft adopts positions absolutely contrary to those laid down in the memorandum of 16 April. Mr. Dean's remarks of 31 August in this Committee reinforce that impression. He said:

"If, by some technique ..... all seismic events can be detected, located and identified by distant instrumentation, then the treaty proposed by the United States and the United Kingdom provides a proper procedure. In such a case the highly competent international staff, including the executive officer of the international scientific commission under the treaty would never certify that an event remained unidentified."

(ENDC/PV.77, p.39-40 ).

In other words the United States representative insists on saying that even if we possessed the necessary instrumentation capable of detecting and identifying at a distance all seismic events, it would be none the less necessary and valuable to have a treaty like that proposed by the Western Powers. For if, according to him, it is certified that there are no unidentified events, there would be no on-site inspections. But it is nevertheless necessary to have a treaty like that proposed.



(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

So the United States and the United Kingdom are proposing that we should work out and sign a treaty involving obligatory inspection, even if we do not need it, even if we believe that it will turn out to be unnecessary.

That means in effect that the Committee is being asked to tackle an unnecessary task, when it is already as much as it can do to carry out what is absolutely necessary. It is as if one were encouraged to build a harbour where there was no water, when there was an urgent need for houses for shelter.

In those circumstances, is it not strange that the Western Powers should be putting forward such proposals? What sense is there in wanting to carry out a useless task when more urgent tasks are to hand, when the Committee should concentrate on reaching an agreement on the measures strictly necessary to put an end to the armaments race? Are not such suggestions and proposals put forward precisely with the object of hampering progress towards an agreement on the ending of nuclear tests and so disarmament in general?

From what I have said, it would seem to follow that the Western Powers are endeavouring, not to find a solution of the question of a nuclear test ban under present conditions - when technical and scientific methods are fully capable of detecting and identifying practically all seismic events - but rather to create a precedent which would justify a future request for control and inspection where there is no need for them.

The claim in these circumstances, that the proposals of the two Western nuclear Powers are new is, to say the least, surprising. Those proposals are simply derived from the old Western position put forward and defended in the past, which cannot and does not lead to an agreement on a nuclear test ban.

In the second document, it is true, the two Western nuclear Powers provide for the banning of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater (ENDC/59) without requesting on-site inspection. However, they say nothing whatever about the question of banning underground nuclear tests and ipso facto they create a state of affairs in which underground nuclear tests appear to be legalized before world opinion.

That is done under the specious pretext that it is impossible to ensure that a treaty forbidding underground nuclear tests could be duly implemented unless it provided for obligatory on-site inspection, which, if it were imposed in the case of the partial cessation of tests, would immediately take the form of espionage.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

By ostensibly adopting a reasonable and flexible position in the matter, the Western Powers are trying by their second draft treaty, concerning the partial banning of tests, to secure the possibility of continuing underground tests and thereby the nuclear arms race.

Without wishing to dwell on the arguments put forward by the United States representative himself on the possibility, by means of underground tests, of continuing the nuclear arms race and of improving those weapons, including thermo-nuclear weapons, still further, we should like to emphasize that it is the United States delegation which has provided the best evidence of the possibility of continuing the nuclear arms race by the continuance of underground tests. If it were necessary, however, it would be easy to produce other evidence in support of that contention, evidence provided by scientists, experts and eminent Western military and political leaders.

The continuance of underground nuclear tests would permit not merely the continuance but the acceleration of the armaments race - especially after the experience accumulated by the United States in the last few years by meticulously planned underground tests which it carried out on the pretext of seeking means of detecting and identifying earthquake shocks. Under those conditions, the partial suspension of underground tests could only serve to divert world opinion from the preparations for nuclear war, and to create the false impression that measures are being taken to stop the armaments race, whereas, by continuing underground tests, the nuclear Powers would be in a position to increase still further their destructive capacity.

That is a dangerous prospect. It is especially dangerous because in that case world opinion would not be constantly alerted to the danger to peace and to all mankind represented by underground nuclear experiments and the consequent improvement in nuclear weapons. To put forward those proposals is to attempt to create the impression that something is being done, or actually has been done, to stop the armaments race, whereas the reverse is true. Such propositions, designed to weaken the peoples' vigilance, can only serve in reality to accelerate the armaments race.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

We agree, of course, with Mr. Dean in believing that "no treaty, comprehensive" - he means a comprehensive treaty on the banning of nuclear tests in all environments -

"or limited will stop the spread of nuclear weapons if a non-party country is really determined to go ahead despite what the present nuclear Powers do." (ENDC/PV.77, p. 44.)

Mr. Dean's assertion is confirmed by the attitude adopted by General de Gaulle, President of the French Republic, at his press conference on 15 May 1962.

"It is true" he said, "that one might have thought that the United States and Great Britain, which seemed at one stage to be entertaining the idea, wished to agree, at least, on the prohibition of new testing. If they came to an agreement on this subject they might expect every other State in the world - and that includes France - to suspend its own tests. These two Powers, of course, would have kept and continued to develop their terrifying weapons, but they would have given the public not, it is true, disarmament, but some apparent satisfaction. And besides, they would keep their monopoly. There was nothing in that notion to persuade France to join the seventeen at Geneva ..... So long as there is no disarmament, that is to say, no reciprocally controlled destruction of weapons, beginning with nuclear vehicles ..... we shall in any case continue our tests."

That shows that certain Powers which are members of NATO and allies of the United States and the United Kingdom intend to continue nuclear tests without worrying about the discussions that are taking place here, even if it proved possible to conclude a treaty banning all nuclear tests. One cannot therefore claim that, by a ban on tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater, it would be possible to prevent other countries from joining in the nuclear armaments race, or that it would be possible to prevent nuclear weapons from coming into the possession of other countries which do not possess them at the moment.

On the contrary, the very fact, as the United States representative has shown, that the nuclear arms race will continue by means of underground nuclear tests will incite other countries technically capable of producing nuclear weapons, to join in the nuclear arms race. Far from discouraging them, a partial treaty, by de facto legalizing underground nuclear tests, might well incite other countries which are not at the moment taking part in the nuclear arms race to increase their efforts to produce nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

The partial suspension of nuclear tests, provided for in the second United States and United Kingdom draft, would be useful and acceptable only if at the same time means could be found of putting an end to underground nuclear tests, and if we succeeded in agreeing to cease underground nuclear tests provisionally and simultaneously, an idea put forward and supported by a number of delegations which have taken part in these discussions. Then and only then, the proposed ban on nuclear tests in the three environments could contribute to the conclusion of a treaty for the final banning of all nuclear tests.

As Mr. Barrington, the representative of Burma, said at our 78th meeting: "It seems to us quite evident that a treaty covering the atmosphere, outer space and underwater, which left all the parties free to test underground, could not last for long. It would have a most precarious and, in all probability, a very short life. To see why that is likely to be so we have only to recall Mr. Dean's recent recital of what could be accomplished through underground tests in the field of nuclear weaponry (ENDC/PV.71, p.20) - a recital which was used by the Soviet representative (ENDC/PV.76, pp.17 et seq.) as his main argument against the proposed partial test ban. Our conclusion, therefore, is that a partial test ban could have no lasting independent existence; it could not hope to endure unless it was extended within a reasonably short period to all environments; it must somehow be linked to, must lead to and become absorbed in a comprehensive treaty. Let us always keep in mind the fact that a partial test ban treaty which came to grief could easily do more harm than not having a partial test ban treaty at all." (ENDC/PV.78, pp. 6-7.)

During a temporary cessation of underground nuclear tests, as suggested by certain delegations, the nuclear Powers might endeavour, with far greater success, to reach a solution of the question of the permanent banning of underground tests on the basis of the memorandum of the eight non-aligned Powers, the only basis so far accepted by both parties, although not in the same way.

We really cannot seriously discuss the banning of underground nuclear tests while such tests are going on and while certain nuclear Powers are giving free rein to their zeal in the competition for improving nuclear weapons. Peace treaties are not discussed while hostilities are going on. For a serious discussion of a peace treaty, there must be at least a cease-fire, a truce, an armistice.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

In defending the detailed provisions of the United States and the United Kingdom proposals on a partial suspension of nuclear tests, or the alternative draft providing for obligatory on-site inspection, the United States representative, taking as his text the statements made by the President of the United States at his press conference of 29 August, proposed that the Sub-Committee on Nuclear Tests should continue its work during the recess in our discussions, and should continue to negotiate on the basis of the two draft treaties submitted to the Conference by the United States and the United Kingdom delegations. He concluded his speech with these words:

"That is the position of the United States and the United Kingdom.

We hope that it will also be the position of the Soviet Union."

(ENDC/PV. 77, p. 47)

One cannot but be amazed at the audacity with which the delegations of the Western nuclear Powers, after affirming that they accept, though naturally with reservations, the eight-Power memorandum as a basis for discussion, now seek, most inappropriately, to replace the basis on which, according to nearly all the delegations, discussions on a nuclear test ban should be held -- namely, the eight-Power memorandum -- by another basis, none other than the draft treaty submitted by the Western Powers. In fact the two documents presented by the Western Powers represent -- as we have said before -- nothing more than a new version edition of their earlier attitude. Those documents are drawn up with the purpose of perpetuating the nuclear arms race. That is particularly true of the second draft treaty (ENDC/59). Those two documents cannot, therefore, serve as a basis for negotiation.

In his statement today, the United Kingdom representative said that the Western Powers thought that their proposals were in keeping with the spirit of the memorandum. But if so, why do they need any other basis for discussion than that of the memorandum? Why do they not take the memorandum as the basis of discussion instead of offering us two drafts which are in flagrant contradiction with the principles of the memorandum? If they accept the spirit of the memorandum, if they agree with that spirit, why not use it as basis for discussion and conclude the necessary treaties for banning nuclear tests underground as well as in the other environments at the earliest possible moment? We are amazed at the attitude of the Western nuclear Powers.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

In the circumstances, it would be pointless to request the Sub-Committee on the discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests to conduct discussions on the basis of the proposals of the two Western nuclear Powers, on the basis of the treaties which they have submitted and to negotiate on the basis of the two drafts, for they do not at present hold out any prospect of agreement; on the contrary they create conditions favourable to the continuation of the nuclear arms race.

It is our opinion, however, that it would not be impossible to come to an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests and their banning in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater, if at the same time it could be agreed that underground nuclear tests would not be carried out during the negotiations on an agreement for their final cessation on the basis of the eight-Power memorandum. That is, moreover, the opinion of the great majority of delegations here, including all the delegations of the non-aligned countries which have spoken up till now. That idea was expressed particularly clearly by the Swedish representative, Mr. Edberg, who described the memorandum in the following terms:

"We still feel that it provides not only a realistic but probably the only possible bridge for a compromise". (ENDC/PV.77, p. 30 )

Only a solution providing for the discontinuance of underground tests and at the same time for that of tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater, can allay mutual suspicions and the anxieties of the peoples of the world. Only that approach to the question can lead to the final banning of nuclear tests in all environments. Only that solution is capable of preventing the subsequent spread of nuclear weapons, their acquisition by other States which have not yet begun to produce them.

It is only, therefore, by agreeing to approach the question of the discontinuance of nuclear tests by the simultaneous ending - though under different forms - of nuclear tests in all environments, that the Western Powers can prove that, in submitting their recent drafts, they did so with the purpose and sincere desire of reaching a solution of the question of the final ending of all tests, in all environments, and of helping to create the conditions necessary for an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

Mr. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): "A guaranteed end to all nuclear testing in all environments is a fundamental objective of the free world. We are deeply convinced that the achievement of this objective would serve our best national interests and the national interests of all the nations of the world ... For the safety and security of all of us, this deadly competition must be halted". (ENDC/PV.75, pp.27-28)

Those words form part of the statement made a few days ago by President Kennedy and Mr. Macmillan when they announced the submission to the Conference of the Disarmament Committee of a draft treaty banning nuclear tests in all environments (ENDC/58) and another treaty for banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, underwater, and in outer space (ENDC/59). On Monday 27 August the drafts were eloquently presented by the United States and United Kingdom representative.

I should like first of all to state that my delegation shares the beliefs expressed in the passages from the joint statement which I ventured to quote. To end all tests, under proper guarantees, and to halt the deadly nuclear competition, for the safety and security of all nations in the world, is a universal desire from which nobody can dissent.

All of us as members of the Conference of the Disarmament Committee have the same mission: to work out two treaties, one banning nuclear weapon tests and the other governing general and complete disarmament. Neither of those tasks can be accomplished without agreement between the great Powers; hence those of us here who represent non-nuclear Powers have a further duty and an additional task: the first is to help the great Powers to reach agreement, and the second is to give expression here to the universal desire for peace and harmony.

One of the principles agreed on by the great Powers to serve as a basis for our negotiations is the principle that disarmament should be implemented by stages (ENDC/5, paragraph 4). That is a wise and, indeed, indispensable principle, since the difficulty of the task demands that it be carried out in stages. Only God himself could say "Let there be light, and there was light"; but there are no leaps in nature. The greatest achievements of man and his science have been made by small steps. To arrive at the goal one must take the first step; sometimes the step is long, sometimes short, but there is no end without a beginning.

(Mr. Padilla Nervo, Mexico)

The time has come when we should take a firm step towards the banning of nuclear weapon tests, even though that has to be done by stages.

We wish for the discontinuance of all tests and we wish that that discontinuance should last and should be backed by legal obligation embodied in a treaty. We wish, too, that the nuclear competition should cease and that a date should be fixed for putting a final end to all tests. We wish that our atmosphere should not be contaminated by radioactivity and that there should be no more explosions underwater or in outer space. When and where should we begin? We know what we ought to do, but let us do straight away what we can do.

A first step might be to cease immediately the tests referred to in document ENDC/59. It cannot be denied that while underground tests are not also banned, the nuclear competition and also the armaments race will continue in that environment, but would it not continue still more violently if tests were still being carried out also in the atmosphere, in the ocean and in outer space? Obviously it would. That cannot be denied either.

The Conference has before it three parallel roads which should lead to the same objective:

- (a) to make a treaty with adequate guarantees banning all nuclear tests in all environments;
- (b) to reach an agreement to stop nuclear testing in the atmosphere, the ocean, and outer space, while continuing to negotiate on methods of controlling underground tests;
- (c) to recommend a date which, for the benefit of mankind and the nuclear Powers, will mark the end of the competition in nuclear weapon testing.

Scientists, statesmen and public opinion in general are clearly and deeply convinced that general and complete disarmament is an empty dream if we cannot first succeed in putting a full stop to all nuclear weapon tests. To seek disarmament while the nuclear competition which spurs on the armaments race continues is as contradictory and as vain as to seek to give practical proof of theoretical astronomy and the findings and conclusions of scientists without rockets or space ships.

We have spent many months in urging the nuclear Powers to conclude a treaty banning all tests. The memorandum submitted by the eight delegations on 16 April (ENDC/28) can serve as a basis for negotiation. We still have not succeeded in this, but we have lost neither faith nor patience and we feel that world opinion is behind us.



(Mr. Padilla Nervo, Mexico)

We are seeking to help the great Powers and we are devoting and shall continue to devote our efforts to that task. But is it possible that our pressure in that direction is greater than the desires and anxieties of all mankind, including the peoples of the nuclear Powers?

I should like to know if all here believe that what is preventing agreement between the nuclear Powers is the interpretation of our memorandum. Does everyone believe that what is holding up agreement is the fear of espionage which, it is imagined, would be carried out by the scientists which a non-political scientific commission might send to carry out an inspection? Does anyone believe that the only obstacle to an agreement is the technical question whether or not it is true that existing instruments can identify all seismic events?

In reality, we ought to recognize that, although those are the reasons which are sometimes pleaded, it is not difficult to discern in them, or behind them, the basic cause or motive of the failure to agree. On the surface, the clash is between two opposite and contradictory political principles: to accept or not to accept the principle of obligatory inspection. I say "on the surface" because that opposition is perhaps the surface appearance and not the deep-lying cause. The cause is complex and many-sided. It seems to consist of considerations of internal politics and international prestige which for the moment the Powers cannot or do not know how to overcome. It also consists of suspicion and the tempting dream of obtaining, by further nuclear tests, some military advantage or an important lead from possible discoveries in that field.

It is possible that the men responsible for national defence and the military experts will continue to believe that the balance of forces demands new improvements in those weapons. Technical and scientific progress (and I am using the word "progress" as implying movement towards the attainment of a goal) has no possible limits in theory or in practice; there are no walls or boundaries to contain the flight of human thought, or man's inexhaustible curiosity, or his passion and genius for discovering devices to give him what he wants, whether for good or for evil.

Where does the search for the perfecting of nuclear weapons and its criminal capabilities lead? The masses of men who inhabit this planet are perhaps unable to understand the complexities involved in the detection,

(Mr. Padilla Nervo, Mexico)

identification and inspection of seismic events and the difficulties inherent in the drafting of treaties, but they are hungry and afraid and they know that the armaments race and the competition in nuclear testing bring the threat of destruction to be added to their poverty, their weakness and ignorance.

What will the statesmen do? Each side is pushing the other, through fear, into an economic crisis, to the limit of the peoples' ability to bear the costs of maintaining an unlimited armaments race. The stress that is placed on the need to destroy the nuclear weapon vehicles proves that there is no greater problem than that of ensuring that there will be no nuclear war. But if the tests are not stopped, the nuclear weapon will soon be the common and general weapon of all military units, and the danger of a nuclear conflict will grow; in the meantime, the more tests are carried out, the greater will be the tendency to regard nuclear weapons as conventional weapons.

It is still not too late. If the Powers wish, they can finish tests today. Perhaps tomorrow they will not be able to, even though they wish to. The only way out is to call a halt and fix a date for ending tests; otherwise they shall never stop.

The Governments know what the peoples want and what they fear; they know what decision they have to take and the dangers that threaten us all. But they still seem to lack the will, the strength or the wisdom necessary to take in good time the political decision which will lead to the desired solution, and they think that they still have time to make that last test which will put them ahead of their rivals in the nuclear testing competition. Their dangerous mistake, in my opinion, is to believe that there is still time to carry out one more series, and yet another series, of tests, and not to know which will be the last. Can one of the Powers perhaps tell us which the last series will be? It would seem as if each nuclear Power persists in carrying out nuclear weapon tests as a deterrent, as a threat, or a means of pressure on the rival Power, as a way of keeping it at bay. Each one has hung over the other a sword of Damocles, but with each day that passes the nuclear competition increases the weight of both swords and weakens the ever more slender thread on which they are hung.

(Mr. Padilla Nervo, Mexico)

That is a precarious and unstable equilibrium, and nobody knows how long it can last. It can be upset from one moment to the next. It is that imminent peril which should compel Governments to reach an agreement. Our delegations in the Conference can think up proposals and suggestions to try to resolve each deadlock in the negotiations; but we are sorry to have to recognize that that is not what is needed. What is needed is that the Powers should be convinced that they cannot, without deadly danger for themselves and for mankind, keep up this situation for much longer.

There is no lack of suggestions at the Conference. A number have been put forward, all of them intended to help the Powers to find points of agreement that would enable them to put an end to nuclear tests. As has been said, the memorandum of the eight non-aligned delegations (ENDC/28) embodies the collective thinking of the eight Governments which they represent, which devoted much energy and goodwill to reaching an agreement; each one made concessions to the others, subordinating its particular attitude to the overriding need to unite in a joint proposal which, by facilitating agreement, would benefit mankind. The nuclear Powers, in their turn, should also come to an agreement.

From the record of our discussions it is difficult to avoid drawing the following conclusions:

(a) the arguments advanced by either side to explain or justify its attitude may be valid from its own point of view, but from the point of view of the higher interest of mankind, those arguments are not acceptable and should be set aside because nothing can justify the indefinite continuation of nuclear weapon tests.

(b) the armaments race does not increase but diminishes national and collective security;

(c) the explosion of nuclear weapons has neither moral nor legal justification. I wish to draw special attention to that point.

(d) The two parties have already accepted one of the obligations mentioned in the eight-Power memorandum. Which one? The obligation to collaborate with the international scientific commission, providing it with the conditions, the data and the facilities which the commission would need to identify suspicious events.

(Mr. Padilla Nervo, Mexico)

It is only with regard to the form and procedure of on-site inspection that there is not yet agreement.

So there is nothing to prevent the Powers from putting into effect immediately those suggestions on which they say they all agree. It would therefore be desirable to set up, without delay, the international scientific commission proposed in the eight-Power memorandum.

At the 77th meeting, the Swedish representative, Mr. Edberg, put the following question:

"Would it not be worthwhile to consider now the establishment, at least on an interim basis, of the commission proposed in the eight-Power memorandum, about which the parties are in agreement?" (ENDC/IV.77. P. 32)

He added:

"We believe that that would extend the area of agreement and thereby also facilitate our endeavours to arrive at a permanent test ban treaty"

(Ibid.)

My delegation agrees with this opinion.

Four months ago I ventured to suggest that the Nuclear Sub-Committee should study the ideas of our memorandum on that point. On 9 May I said:

"In spite of the unfortunate deadlock in the discussions of the Sub-Committee on points or questions of principle which the parties consider it essential to settle before examining and agreeing on other important questions also referred to in the memorandum of the eight delegations, we believe it would be very useful for members of the Sub-Committee to study some of the suggestions contained in the memorandum which have not yet been considered as carefully as they deserve, and try to reach an agreement on them; for agreement on those suggestions could help to settle the questions which are helping to cause the major differences at present.

"Both parties have declared that they accept the memorandum as a whole as a starting point for new negotiations. It would therefore be logical -- and I think we have a right to expect this -- for the Sub-Committee to study all the ideas and suggestions contained in the memorandum with a view to reporting the results of its negotiations on all of them to this Conference. For instance, we need to know whether they agree or differ on the following points:

(Mr. Padilla Nervo, Mexico)

"First: the establishment of a 'system for continuous observation and effective control on a purely scientific and non-political basis'. I quote this sentence from the text of our memorandum. I ask: How do the parties envisage this system with respect to the number and specification of the 'existing networks and observations posts' to be 'designated by agreement' to supply data and reports on their observations to the 'international commission' of 'highly qualified scientists'?"

"Secondly: What, in the opinion of the members of the Sub-Committee, will be the composition of the international commission of scientists? What countries would be asked to designate scientists to serve on the international commission? In what capacity would they be appointed and to whom would they be responsible? Would they or would they not be politically independent? Would they or would they not be regarded as international officials with exclusively scientific functions? Is a scientific, non-political function compatible with representation of a government?"

"Thirdly: If the parties declare that they accept the paragraph of the memorandum which suggests establishing a system for continuous observation and effective control, does that mean that they accept the principle of international control in the form of the system suggested and that, consequently, they will act in accordance with the acceptance?"

"It may reasonably be expected that the nuclear Powers will have different views about what the international commission could do, depending upon whether it is intended to be a scientific body, a political body or a mixed body. In view of these considerations, it seems necessary for the Sub-Committee to consider these additional matters and to suspend, for the time being, the discussion of those points on which there appears to be a deadlock -- which we hope will not prove impossible to break." (ENDC/PV.34, pp. 15 and 16)

I have ventured to quote a few passages from my statement of four months ago to emphasize the importance which my delegation attached to the question.

I should like to point out in that connexion that the Italian representative, speaking in this Committee, has also expressed the desire that the Sub-Committee should study those questions.

(Mr. Padilla Nervo, Mexico)

Certain points in my questions were answered today by the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber, and they follow from some of the proposals contained in the draft treaty submitted by the Western Powers as a basis for negotiations on that subject (ENDC/58). We hope that the three members of the Sub-Committee can negotiate and reach an agreement on that question.

My delegation supports the constructive suggestion of Mr. Dean to the effect that the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests should continue its work during the recess. We hope that it will work with the firm intention of reaching an agreement on tests and that, further, it will examine a related question of the highest importance, namely the following. In my statement on 14 June, at the 56th meeting, on the eve of the recess, I made a suggestion which I think it useful to repeat now:

"Another point that the nuclear Powers might consider during the recess is the proposal made by the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs at the beginning of our discussions, and supported by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mexico to the effect that the great Powers should undertake not to place in orbit, or to station in space, devices with nuclear weapons." (ENDC/PV.56, p.51)

I should like at the same time to express my view that the decision to suspend our discussions between 8 September and 12 November should not mean that the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament should not meet in New York during the sessions of the General Assembly at any moment when it may be considered necessary.

I think too, that the co-Chairmen should continue their consultations during the recess to try to reach an agreement on certain collateral questions of high importance, such as the prevention of the spreading of nuclear weapons and measures to prevent the outbreak of war by accident, miscalculation or failure of communications.

The United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber, has just made some valuable remarks on the question of fixing a date for the ending of tests. I wish to take this opportunity of thanking Mr. Dean and Mr. Godber for having taken into consideration in their draft treaties the suggestion which I made in the name of

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Mexico that a date, if possible 1 January, should be fixed, for suspending tests. I should like also to thank all those representatives who have expressed themselves in favour of our suggestion and I hope that it may be the subject of agreement between the nuclear Powers.

Mankind today are spectators and actors at the beginning of a new epoch. They are watching the birth of a scientific and technical revolution. Both our thoughts and our feelings suffer under the pressures of the atomic age. To be out of tune with it, to fail to understand it, is to grow old, and growing old does not give the right to dispose of youth and its future.

Far away from the Earth on its voyage to Venus, the satellite Mariner II was questioned and sent to the earth immediate answers containing valuable scientific information.

For good or for evil, the great Powers are close to us, they are on the earth amongst the rest of us; but, unlike Mariner II, they still do not hear or answer the cries of the people. Why do people desire the ending of nuclear tests? The answer is obvious: because the weapons that are being tested and perfected by the tests are not designed to be shown in museums. They are there to be used, not only against enemy peoples and towns, but to destroy the civilization we know and to annihilate mankind. There can be no other outcome to a third world war, and nuclear weapons are manufactured and tested in order to wage it.

Mr. Adolfo Lopez Mateos, the President of Mexico, in his message to the Council of the Republic last Saturday, 1 September, referred to the activities of this Committee, by saying:

"We are realists in evaluating our efforts. We can do nothing more than to encourage the nuclear Powers to agree. It is our inescapable duty to uphold the view that disarmament is not an academic question whose solution can be put off indefinitely, but is the only international question of life and death posing the tremendous choice between the destruction of mankind and the fulfilment of its great destiny. We shall obstinately persist in our efforts to ensure that those who possess the nuclear weapon shall find the formulae to

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safeguard mankind from the gravest risk that has threatened it since the beginning, and we hope that, setting aside the arguments and actions by which they uphold their respective debating positions, they will find solutions in accordance with genuine peace and the peace of mind which mankind is anxiously demanding."

President Kennedy has said:

"If we do not destroy the arms we have created, they will destroy us."

Mr. Khrushchev, the President of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, has said:

"The danger of a world war exists. It is clear that thermonuclear weapons are continually being improved, and their existence threatens to reach the critical point in which, as used to be said, the guns start to go off by themselves. Today we might say that the rockets with nuclear warheads are starting to fly by themselves."

Experts tell us that the total nuclear potential in the world today is 250,000 megatons; that is to say 250,000 million tons of TNT.

According to the latest statistics the population of the world is already more than 3,000 millions and, though that is a very high figure, the existing stock of explosives is so huge that it works out at 80 tons of TNT for each one of the earth's inhabitants. And still, as if that was not enough, the manufacture and improvements of these weapons continue. Why?

It is also said that the nuclear weapons existing in the world are equivalent in power to  $12\frac{1}{2}$  million of the bombs of the type that was dropped on Hiroshima. It is calculated that there are already about 60,000 nuclear and thermonuclear bombs of unprecedented destructive power and, as we know, the vehicles necessary to carry them to their targets exist.

Before this alarming prospect, the arguments which separate the Powers in this Committee and prevent an agreement appear ridiculously small and insignificant.

Mankind wishes to live for ever: not merely for the time that is granted by the nuclear Powers; and man wishes to live without the air that we breathe being steadily poisoned. To what right do the nuclear Powers appeal? Who has given them title deeds to the open sea, the atmosphere and outer space? The only right they can invoke is the right of force, which is not precisely the same as the force of right.



(Mr. Padilla Nervo, Mexico)

The overwhelming necessity and duty of halting the deadly competition should not be subordinated to the will of a Power; none of them, we believe, has the right to choose for us between the road of explosions and the road of discontinuance. No Power has the right of life and death over its own citizens, much less over the other peoples of the world, and less still the right to destroy our civilization. Who has given the nuclear Powers the right to deal with humanity as the fancy takes them - to destroy it or to allow it to continue its progress?

We believe that no Power has the right to say to the other: "Either you accept my conditions, or else both of us will resort to measures which will put mankind in peril". This amounts to agreeing on one thing only: continuing the deadly competition in nuclear weapon tests.

That would be a sad, disastrous and diabolical understanding. If one Power does not accept the other's conditions, then both of them agree, they reach an understanding. And on what do they agree? What do they decide? Do they decide not to compromise, do they decide to continue their war of nuclear tests today and tomorrow without end or remedy, incapable of breaking the vicious circle? No Power has the right to take that decision. We must put an end to that madness! That is what they ought to agree on. World opinion hopes that the Powers will fix a deadline, an unalterable date as from which they will put an end to nuclear weapon tests. Mankind has the right to hope that, once this date has been agreed, all will keep to it and respect it as a sacred duty.

To recognize the existing political difficulties does not mean that we justify them, but to overcome obstacles it is necessary to know what they are. We do not believe that those obstacles are insuperable. What is needed is a new outlook and a different spirit enabling us to put first things first.

The complex of qualities and energies which combine to make possible man's bold, free, soaring flight into boundless space, to fulfil the most ambitious dream in his history, should also be capable of setting aside the obstacles which separate and divide us down here.

The competition in nuclear testing will ultimately make the peaceful use of outer space impossible.

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In order that the use of outer space should be genuinely peaceful, it must become a joint international venture governed by a law in the common interest. Without that condition, the competition for the conquest and mastery of space cannot be peaceful, any more than nuclear competition, and in a short time one competition will encourage the other and it will no longer be possible to separate them or to hold them back. The exploits of the space pilots, in themselves an object of admiration, make it more serious and urgent for the Powers to put a final end to their nuclear weapon tests.

In the future the rockets which drive space ships may be propelled by nuclear fuel, and that will totally change our present conception of general and complete disarmament and our present ideas on international verification and control.

How much time do we have? Neither the governments nor the experts know, nor does anybody else; but everyone feels that it is necessary to hurry because we are living on borrowed time.

Each party constantly repeats in its speeches that the other is doing all it can to prevent an agreement, and at the same time proclaims its own desire and intention to put an end to the nuclear tests.

An examination of the opposing arguments suggests the following observations: the risk of continuing the competition in nuclear weapons tests is a thousand times greater than the risk of accepting an agreement with imperfect guarantees, because in a treaty no automatic, 100 per cent guarantees can be enforced against the will of the parties nor can machinery be devised to compel them to comply with it.

In the last analysis, the best guarantee of the carrying out of a treaty is national honour and good faith, which is something we should not forget.

The carrying out of a treaty between independent States cannot be imposed or maintained by force; there are only two sanctions in the event of violation: international condemnation of the violator and the denunciation of the treaty by the injured party.

Every treaty between equals contains escape clauses and its efficacy depends, in the last analysis, on the sovereign will of the contracting parties; but I must emphasise that an agreement for the suspension of tests should contain what

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the powers consider to be adequate and reasonable safeguards ensuring that it will be respected. It is not for us but for the Powers themselves to determine what these safeguards should be. How are they to do it? That is for them to agree on, not for us.

The Powers are still asserting their right to choose; but for how long will statesmen have the right to choose? In the nuclear competition itself the Powers are limiting their own right to choose, and each one is doing what the rival Power forces it to do. Each day they will become less free in their choice of the road to follow; their decisions will become mere automatic reflexes.

Sovereignty, self determination, free will, will no longer be capable of enabling the Powers to escape from the vicious circle, nor of preventing the chain reaction which holds them on its pre-determined track; but we still have time to exercise our right to choose. Let us choose the road of agreement, the only one which leads to security and peace.

The principles on which both national policy and international life are based will have to be changed. What now appears impossible will then be feasible and the springs of human behaviour will be adapted to the new realities and needs of the atomic age.

Perhaps we do not clearly realise the vast implications of the new age of science and technology. The most practical minded scientists and the most imaginative thinkers cannot conceive the limits, the tempo and the character of a civilisation which is developing at an unprecedented rate and in a direction we cannot guess.

Our generation is a bridge and a link between one epoch and the next. The transition between the present and the future involves painful, far-reaching changes in thought and in action. The future of mankind depends on our capacity to adjust ourselves to the responsibilities of the present time. On us depends whether civilisation will continue to pass on its lighted torch from generation to generation.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): First, with the approval of my co-Chairman, I would like to announce to the Conference that we were able to agree at a very late hour last night on a draft report and we have been polishing it this morning. It has now been submitted to the Secretariat for translation

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and distribution to the Conference and we very much hope that it can be laid before you for your consideration this afternoon. On behalf of my co-Chairman and myself I should like to express our regret that we did not have it before the Committee at the opening of the meeting this morning, but it was not physically or mechanically possible.

I should like also to tell the Chairman that my co-Chairman and I believe we should also recommend the holding of an afternoon meeting today, both to finish the list of speakers who have already inscribed their names and also, if possible, for the consideration of the draft report.

The CHAIRMAN (Romania): It seems to me that we shall have to continue our debate in the afternoon. Since there are no objections we shall meet at 3.30 p.m.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I listened with great interest to the statements made at our meeting on Monday, 3 September, (ENDC/PV.78) by the representatives of Burma, India, Nigeria, Ethiopia and Brazil, and I listened with rapt admiration this morning to the statement of the representative of Mexico. I only wish that I could let my imagination soar and that I had the same gift of expression that he has. I was particularly interested in the amplifying remarks of the representative of Nigeria (ibid. p. 27 ) concerning the appeal which he had made on 29 August (ENDC/PV.76, pp.44-45).

I should like to say to the representative of Bulgaria that, in the drafting of our proposed treaty on general and complete disarmament and in the drafting of our two treaties, one the comprehensive treaty (ENDC/58) and the other the partial treaty (ENDC/59) put forward in the case of our not being able to achieve a comprehensive treaty, neither President Kennedy, nor Secretary of State Rusk, nor I have, I can assure him, been activated by anything except the intention to put before the Conference honestly conceived and, we hope, workmanlike treaties, and to try to present them here in a workmanlike and a non-polemical manner; and, whatever reports to the contrary by some very brilliant young reporters he may read, I assure him that the Government of the United States is not interested in putting before the Conference drafts of treaties which we know in advance our Soviet colleagues will not accept. On the contrary, we are continually and constantly engaged in trying to find ways and means of reaching agreement with our Soviet

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colleagues and, despite the fact that we have not been able to do that so far I do believe -- perhaps this is only my personal opinion -- that the rather constructive exchanges which we have had here and the meetings that my co-Chairman and I have had have put us some distance down the road. We still have a long way to go, but I sincerely hope that representatives will not believe some of those bright imaginings of brilliant reporters.

In his very interesting statement on Monday the representative of Burma asked a specific question (ENDC/PV.78, pp. 8-9) with respect to the conduct of on-site inspection as provided for in the United Kingdom-United States draft treaty (ENDC/58). The question he asked centered around paragraph 6 of article VIII of that treaty and was directed to the means by which events might be chosen under a quota arrangement for on-site inspection. The representative of the United Kingdom had dealt with that question in part at our meeting on 27 August as may be seen from pages 21-22 and 24 of the verbatim record (ENDC/PV.75).

First, however, I should like to point out that it seems to my delegation that in any treaty arrangements which provide for obligatory on-site inspections one could have at least two possible arrangements. One could inspect either all of the unidentified events which occurred and which could not be discarded for one reason or the other, or one could inspect some number less than all of them. Under the United Kingdom-United States draft (ENDC/56) inspection of all events would mean looking within a country's territory at all events certified as unidentified by the international commission. This would mean inspection of all events which had been located and not discarded as ineligible for inspection because they met certain criteria which would allow them to be classified as earthquakes. Now, the on-site inspection of all certified events would mean the inspection of an admittedly very large number of such events on the territory of the Soviet Union every year.

On the other hand, if we try to meet the concern of our Soviet colleagues about intelligence or espionage, as we have done our best to do in the draft treaty that we have submitted, if there is a small quota of events to be inspected every year, then it means that only a certain number of the total of unidentified events will be selected every year for inspection. The Soviet Union, as I have said, has always indicated that it desires to have only a small number of

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inspections conducted on its territory each year and, in view of the Soviet objection to numerous on-site inspections, the United Kingdom and the United States have proposed in their draft treaty that only a certain number of those unidentified events be looked at in each year, under some quota arrangement. The eight-nation memorandum, however, implies that inspection would be conducted of every unidentified event. Let me repeat -- inspection of every unidentified event.

Taking into consideration our Soviet colleagues' desire -- namely, that they did not want all unidentified events on their territory inspected -- the United States and the United Kingdom proposed only a small number of on-site inspections, a proposal which involves a certain quota of events to be inspected on the territory of the nuclear Powers each year. That was done, as I have pointed out, so as to reduce the number of on-site inspections while, at the same time, providing -- to our way of thinking -- a maximum degree of deterrence. But let me make it clear that the United Kingdom and the United States have always been willing to accept automatic inspection by the commission of all unidentified events if the other side will show itself willing to accept the obligation to facilitate such inspection.

We are quite willing, under such circumstances, to accept the blank cheque of an unlimited number of inspections by the commission on the territory of the Soviet Union necessary for the identification of each and every unidentified event. But in such circumstances we would like to have the arrangement such that the cheque would not "bounce".

As regards the choice of which event might be selected for inspection under a quota system, my delegation has always believed that the selection of certain events to be inspected under a quota system should in all fairness -- since we are not going to have the right to inspect all unidentified events -- be left to the other nuclear side. The other side in each case will, of course, be the party or parties primarily concerned, although we recognize that every party to the treaty will, to some extent, be concerned if the control system does not operate in the most effective and efficient manner, as the representative of Mexico so clearly pointed out.

The second good reason for leaving that decision in the hands of the other nuclear side under a quota arrangement appears to my delegation to be the necessity to take speedy action and to avoid placing upon the commission the burden of taking

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the final political decision to conduct an inspection. The commission would, of course, carry out the inspection as provided in the United States-United Kingdom treaty. That is another point on which we are quite open-minded.

On Monday afternoon, at our seventy-ninth meeting, we heard the representative of the Soviet Union making a statement on the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, and the burden of his statement was, first, that the United Kingdom-United States treaty drafts (ENDC/58 and ENDC/59) of 27 August were old positions and, second, that with respect to the partial ban treaty draft (ENDC/59) the United States and the United Kingdom would also have to assume an obligation to cease underground tests with no effective control.

Yesterday afternoon, in the meeting of our Sub-Committee on nuclear weapon tests (ENDC/SC.I/PV.25), I reviewed the facts concerning those two allegations and I showed in some detail why the remarks of the Soviet representative were not correct. In view of the lateness of the hour and in view of the care with which the representative of the United Kingdom went over that matter this morning, I will -- I am sure my colleagues will be happy to know -- cut out well over half of the rather laborious and detailed speech which would otherwise have been inflicted upon the Committee. So this morning I should like to consider some of those points in a very brief form.

The first area in which the United States and the United Kingdom have moved is on the question of detection stations, and on that I think I can rely on what my United Kingdom colleague said at yesterday's meeting of the Sub-Committee.

Another area in which substantial changes have occurred is that concerned with the question of on-site inspections. There our position has changed in two essential respects. First, we have agreed to discuss the reduction of the quota of on-site inspections in the Soviet Union provided that the Soviet Union agrees to accept the obligation to facilitate on-site inspections by the commission. Secondly, we have agreed to place the formation of the inspection teams in the hands of an executive officer under the supervision of the commission, the only stipulation being that nationals of States being inspected should not be involved in inspecting their own territory. This last change is particularly important. In the first place, there is now no absolute requirement that in the teams inspecting the territory of one of the nuclear Powers a fixed percentage of the team is to be made up of nationals of the other nuclear side. We would hope that the

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executive officer, in selecting such teams, would include such nationals if qualified for the job. But I would point out that there is no such requirement placed on the executive officer when he forms the team, nor would we have any means of influencing him, nor any desire to do so.

In the second place, the allies of nuclear Powers on the territories of which inspection teams may be conducting an on-site inspection are not prohibited from the inspection team. That represents, we believe, a very important step forward and one which, I am sure, all delegations realize involves a very careful weighing of the risks on the part of our two Governments.

I might say at this point that there should, under these circumstances, be no difficulty in working out the composition of an inspection team. I refer representatives to what I said in greater detail on that point at yesterday's meeting of the Sub-Committee. I said that it might facilitate the organizing of those inspection teams if the executive officer were to propose the names of eminent scientists who could be agreed upon in advance by the commission, and who could then be organized into panels of teams. I fully recognize that the most eminent of those scientists would probably not be able to drop important work at a moment's notice to go on an inspection expedition, but other scientists could probably arrange to find the time. Of course, it would be necessary to have the teams composed of scientists properly trained for on-site inspection tasks, but that again could probably be worked out. The main point is that those approved panels would then form the basic group from which any individual team could be formed by the executive of the commission. Those eminent scientists could also advise the commission on steps which it could take to reduce the possibility of espionage or intelligence work.

In sum, therefore, our corollary position to the unconditional obligation to give up nuclear weapon tests under a sound and workable treaty, which I think we all agree should be firm and unconditional, is that there must also be an unconditional obligation to facilitate the objective of on-site inspections, by the commission, of certain unidentified events. Therefore, in that respect our position does remain unchanged, but we think that that is logical and reasonable. We have come a very long way indeed on both the quota of inspections and the formation of inspection teams. Those are not small moves; they are major changes on issues of substance.



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If I may go back a little on the question of the formation of the panel which I suggested yesterday in the meeting of the Sub-Committee, the primary object I had in mind in suggesting such a procedure was to assure the Soviet representative that we want on-site inspections by the commission to be conducted in as objective a manner as possible. Certainly the Soviet representative has told us that on-site inspection is merely a vehicle for gathering intelligence or espionage. We recognize that the Soviet Union has said that it might be willing to admit some on-site inspections which it would invite to its territory. But, for the life of me, I cannot see the difference -- as far as espionage is concerned -- between an inspection team coming in as a matter of right and an inspection team coming in as a matter of invitation. I have explained why the invitational procedure provides no deterrence, in our judgement, to a State which might wish to conduct secret tests.

Nevertheless, in an effort to reach agreement, the fact that the Soviet Union might invite some inspections has led me to conclude that the Soviet fear of espionage or intelligence gathering might be somewhat reduced if it were to invite the inspections, as perhaps it might have some say with regard to the places which might or might not be visited in such cases. So that my hope in proposing a panel of eminent scientists to advise the commission is to assure the Soviet Union that inspections would be carried out in as impartial a manner as possible.

There could, of course, be no Soviet veto on any particular inspection. The obligation to facilitate inspection as a matter of obligation would have to be clear-cut. But it was my thought in proposing a panel of eminent scientists to advise the commission that it might mitigate any fears of the Soviet Union about the lack of objectivity in on-site inspections. We thought that if we could set up those criteria for such inspections and if we could get those scientists to advise the commission, then perhaps we could go a long way towards overcoming Soviet objections.

Make no mistake about it, the inspection teams of the commission will be able to look at all events certified as unidentified; but the scientists might consult with the party being inspected and with the commission in an effort to ensure that each inspection was being carried out in a manner best calculated to reduce the risks to the national security of any party.

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I made that suggestion in an effort to try to meet the Soviet Union on the point that inspections might pose a danger to its national security. But, in answer to a specific question from my Soviet colleague, I said that we still were not departing from our stand that each party to the treaty would have to obligate itself to allow the commission to make the inspections of those certified events. I again said to my Soviet colleague that I stand ready at any time to discuss, in a careful and sensible manner, the further modalities of on-site inspection in the hope that we can provide adequate safeguards against any possible form of espionage in connexion with on-site inspection.

With regard to the Soviet representative's saying (ENDC/PV.79, p. 34) that he considered it improper for any government to be suspected in advance of violating the treaty, let me say that the Government of the United States suspects no State in advance of violating an agreement or it would not be a party to such an agreement. The provision on the use of data from national stations cited by the Soviet representative applies equally to the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as to the Soviet Union, and indeed to all other parties to the treaty. We do not anticipate that anyone will falsify data. We are merely applying the prudent precaution of making sure now that no such suspicion can arise in the future with regard to any party to the treaty. We wish no such accusations or suspicions as the Soviet representative spoke of to arise under any treaty and, therefore, we have provided that the verification system should operate effectively and above suspicion.

With regard to the question of sovereignty, we have already pointed out in some detail that the acceptance of treaty obligations, including those for verification, are undertaken as an exercise of sovereign rights by a State. As such they cannot infringe the rights of States, but rather make such States more fully responsible members of the international community.

We are open to reason on this question and we are quite willing to discuss any formulation the Soviet Union might propose in order to take account of Soviet questions on the problem of the sovereign rights of States. But I do not think we should be prevented from undertaking important international obligations, such as outlawing all further nuclear tests of any character, in any place and in all environments for the benefit of all humanity, by the bogey of sovereignty. I

(Mr. Dean, United States)

think it is our problem as political scientists and statesmen to meet here and to solve those problems. I do not believe humanity will listen to us very long if we say, "We would like to stop all nuclear tests, but we cannot do so because otherwise it would be a violation of sovereignty." I believe that we political scientists have got to be as bold, creative and imaginative in solving those problems as in solving the problems our physical cousins have handed to us.

Yesterday the Soviet representative said that the Soviet Union was quite ready to conclude an agreement for a nuclear test ban in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater (ENDC/PV.79, p. 37). But in expressing its readiness to do this the Soviet Union attached a specific condition. That condition was that we would have to abstain from underground nuclear tests and assume corresponding obligations. As my United Kingdom colleague has said, we are more than willing to continue negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty. Our answer is a clear and unconditional "yes" to that. But, as I have pointed out, it cannot be expected, in connexion with the treaty in regard to the atmosphere, underwater and outer space which we have proposed, that we also accept an uninspected, unpoliced moratorium with respect to underground tests. That is the very point that is at issue in the comprehensive treaty we have proposed, and I submit that it is not reasonable or logical to ask us to give up the very point that is at issue in the comprehensive treaty, by which we could ban all nuclear tests in all environments, considering that we put forward the partial treaty in order to protect humanity while we are working that out.

We have stated our reasons for not accepting the kind of arrangement proposed (GEN/DNT/122) on 28 November 1961 by the Soviet Union; but in order to be very clear on that point let me repeat those reasons briefly for the Committee.

We do not intend to repeat the sad experience we had in August 1961 when we learned, in this very building, that it was a grave error to rely on the word of the Soviet Union -- indeed, on the statement of Chairman Khrushchev of 14 January 1961 -- that the Soviet Union would not resume testing unless the United States or the United Kingdom did so first. It seems to me that it does not profit us very much to say that there was not a moratorium because there was that solemn statement by Chairman Khrushchev, which to my knowledge was never changed in any way. It certainly was not changed at the meeting that President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev had in Vienna on 4 June 1961. We had no knowledge that it was going to be changed until we learned of the tests on 1 September.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

So we believe that all disarmament commitments, however undertaken, must be accompanied by the necessary measures to ensure effective control. We are not talking here about a fisheries treaty or a boundary treaty; we are talking here about something that could possibly change the whole balance of the world, or perhaps could result in the complete extinction of the nationality of one or more of the parties to the treaty. So let us be clear. We are in favour of a comprehensive ban under appropriate international supervision, and the United Kingdom and ourselves have submitted a treaty to that effect.

We believe that to agree to an uninspected, uncontrolled moratorium on underground tests, for whatever reason, would contravene the spirit and purpose of the proposal by the United Kingdom and ourselves for a partial ban in the atmosphere, underwater and in outer space. If we could reach agreement on banning underground tests under international supervision here and now, my Government believes we should sign a comprehensive treaty along the lines we have proposed in document ENDC/58, and we sincerely hope we can reach such an agreement. But, if not, then the risks of a partial ban cannot be undertaken without adequate assurance that an unpoliced moratorium on underground testing does not so affect our national security in the area of underground testing that we might not be able to survive.

We have carefully weighed the factors involved in a partial ban such as we have put forward in document ENDC/59. There are risks in such a partial ban, and we are prepared to accept those risks, but we cannot accept the risk of continued secret underground testing by one side without that side being deterred by an effective control mechanism from undertaking such tests.

It is clear that the United Kingdom and the United States have moved forward to meet the Soviet Union on many issues. We are quite willing to negotiate on the basis of our two draft treaties in documents ENDC/58 and ENDC/59. I believe that what I said in reply to the representative of Burma at Monday's plenary meeting, and outlined again today, and what I said in the Sub-Committee yesterday about our intentions regarding an advisory panel of eminent scientists to advise the commission are very constructive moves, and we look forward to corresponding constructive moves on the part of the Soviet Union.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

As is well known, negotiations require the patient and constructive work of two sides. So the challenge is squarely before the Soviet Union. The United States sincerely hopes that we have not heard the last word from the Soviet Union and that we can now move forward to the conclusion of an effective nuclear test ban treaty banning tests in all environments before 1 January 1963, the cut-off date suggested by the representative of Mexico (ENDC/PV.34, p.16). We should be able to do so, but, if not, let us take the partial treaty (ENDC/59) and then continue to negotiate reasonably and constructively on a comprehensive ban treaty.

In conclusion, I wish to say that we hope the Soviet Union will accept our proposal to continue meetings of the Sub-Committee here in Geneva during the recess to work out a comprehensive ban treaty or, failing that, a partial treaty along the lines of document ENDC/59.

The CHAIRMAN (Romania): In view of the lateness of the hour -- it is already 1.15 p.m. -- I would ask the representative of the Soviet Union whether he agrees to make his statement at our afternoon meeting.

Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): My delegation agrees to make its statement this afternoon.

The CHAIRMAN (Romania): Before we adjourn I just want to take note of the announcement of the co-Chairmen that agreement has been reached on the draft report, which will shortly be circulated as a document.<sup>1/</sup>

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.

